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Abstract
Anti-Americanism has reached an unset-
tling global high that has been mani-
fested in everything from opinion polls to 
violent protests. Latin America is geopo-
litically important to the United States, 
while harboring anti-American senti-
ment. The history of U.S.-Latin America 
relations and the most recent public 
opinion polls are analyzed to unearth the 
roots of regional anti-Americanism. Two 
case studies include a country notorious 
for its blatant anti-Americanism (Ven-
ezuela) and a country traditionally allied 
with the United States (Mexico). Despite 
different political or historical relations 
with the United States, Latin American 
countries have come to an anti-American 
consensus. 
Introduction
On President Bush’s summer 2007 five-
nation tour of Latin America, he was met 
by crowds of protesters angry about the 
Iraq War, immigration policy, or Bush’s 
leadership. Anti-Americanism in Latin 
America is at an unsettling high, and 
there is reason to believe that it will not 
dissipate as soon as Bush leaves office. 
Historical, economic, and political 
causes all contribute to form a complex, 
sometimes ambivalent opinion of the 
United States and Americans. "The 
Latin American Consensus" attempts to 
determine the causes of Latin America’s 
recent anti-Americanism and unearth the 
roots of anti-Americanism in the region.
Such a widespread dissatisfaction with 
the United States is worthy of investi-
gation. Also, it seems a region sharing 
deep historical ties, numerous trade 
agreements, membership in interna-
tional organizations, and millions of its 
citizens with the United States would be 
politically important to policymakers and 
scholars alike. However, Latin America 
has not been granted the political atten-
tion that it deserves, especially regarding 
research on anti-Americanism. 
Research on the causes of global 
anti-Americanism often brushes over or 
entirely overlooks Latin America. In ad-
dition to lacking in the realm of research, 
the significance of anti-Americanism in 
Latin America is undervalued by poli-
cymakers as well. Areas like the Middle 
East have absorbed the majority of 
Americans’ attention and concern about 
anti-Americanism. Concern over the 
Middle East is completely understand-
able, as violent anti-Americanism poses 
a grave threat. But as author Julia Sweig 
states, Latin America was “the cradle 
of Third World anti-Americanism long 
before radical Islamic terrorist groups 
would make their wrath felt” (2006, 8).  
The anti-Americanism Sweig refers to 
is still prevalent; recent polls unveil a 
majority of negative opinion toward the 
U.S. in many Latin American countries. 
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Methodology
In this study, existing literature, recent 
opinion polls, and two case study 
countries are used to unearth the 
causes of current anti-Americanism in 
Latin America. Mexico and Venezuela 
were used as case studies to explain 
the phenomenally high levels of anti-
Americanism in Latin America because 
of their historical and political ties to 
the United States. While Mexico shares 
a border and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the 
U.S. and is a historical ally of the U.S., 
Mexicans have demonstrated high 
levels of anti-Americanism in polls. 
Mexico serves as a useful case study 
for other historical allies of the United 
States that are of the more economically 
developed Latin American countries. 
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile are all historical U.S. allies 
and more economically developed than 
other Latin American countries, and 
demonstrate anti-Americanism in polls. 
The elections of leftist leaders opposed 
to U.S. foreign policy make Venezuela 
a valuable case study for examining the 
causes of anti-Americanism in these 
countries. It is clear how leaders such 
as Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez feel 
about the United States, but determining 
how the citizens perceive the U.S. merits 
our concern. The three-tiered model 
created by Polly Diven in her piece "The 
Complex and Contradictory Nature of 
Anti-Americanism" (2007) will be used 
as the theoretical framework for analysis 
for this study. This three-tiered model 
best embodies the multifaceted and 
integrated nature of the components of 
anti-Americanism. 
Diven suggests that there are three 
categories of anti-Americanism. The first 
tier is the most long-term and deeply 
rooted, based on historical grudges held 
in a nation’s collective memory as well 
as the current unipolar international 
system structure. These are factors that 
are either impossible or slow to change. 
For example, Mexicans still have not 
entirely forgotten the 1867 territorial 
acquisition of Mexico by the United 
States, even though over a century has 
passed. It is probably not the primary 
source of anti-Americanism, but it still 
serves as a base for other causes to add 
on to. The second tier includes conflicts 
regarding cultural and value differences. 
The third tier includes anti-Americanism 
fueled by leadership and policy choices. 
These factors are often mistaken as 
the cause of anti-Americanism, though 
Diven claims that these factors are more 
symptomatic than causal. The third tier 
is short-term and easily changed, as it is 
based on opposition to specific leaders 
and policies. Diven argues that a mix-
ture of the tiers combines to constitute 
anti-Americanism. Figureheads of U.S. 
foreign policy often become the target of 
anti-American protests. As Jose Figueres 
explained, “people cannot spit on a 
foreign policy, which is what they meant 
to do” (McPherson 2003, 9).  Although 
this quote is in response to protests that 
took place in 1958 when Figueres was 
president of Costa Rica, this sentiment 
still holds true. President George W. 
Bush has been scorned worldwide, and 
Latin America is no exception. These 
tiers can be used to explain the depth of 
anti-Americanism, or how much opinion 
of the U.S. will change with the upcom-
ing change in presidents, and how much 
is more deeply rooted and attributed to 
other factors.
Analyzing history, economics and 
politics separately yields a very different 
perception of anti-Americanism in a 
country than if one examines them 
in conjunction. Diven’s three-tiered 
model creates a comprehensive view of 
anti-Americanism in a country because 
it effectively categorizes the causes of 
anti-Americanism, and it weights those 
categories to attribute their significance. 
Looking at economic relations alone 
between Mexico and the United States, 
it would appear that the countries had 
close relations and there was no reason 
for anti-Americanism. They are both 
members of NAFTA and remittances 
from Mexicans in the United States is 
Mexico’s second largest source of Gross 
Domestic Product. The model recognizes 
that there are historical and structural 
reasons for anti-Americanism in Mexico. 
Venezuela’s current leader is very 
anti-U.S. but the model recognizes that 
the Venezuelan people also have other 
reasons to harbor resentment toward the 
U.S.
Because each country in Latin 
America has its own unique history and 
relationship with the United States, and 
because countless factors contribute to 
anti-Americanism, it is impossible to 
name every cause of anti-Americanism 
in each country. Mexico and Venezu-
ela serve as excellent case studies for 
explaining the phenomena of different 
relations, yet similar views toward the 
U.S. Each country shares elements with a 
number of other Latin American coun-
tries that are potential causes for anti-
Americanism. 
Existing literature makes it clear 
that anti-Americanism exists and is a 
problem. Literature alone, however, 
is not sufficient to determine to what 
extent anti-Americanism is a problem 
in Latin America. Recent opinion polls 
are helpful in examining how Latin 
Americans feel about the United States 
for a couple of reasons. First, polls are 
the best method available of capturing 
the most recent, collective feelings of a 
country. Second, there are polls available 
on a wide range of topics, allowing us to 
examine the many facets that compose 
anti-Americanism and pinpoint areas 
that people feel the most strongly about. 
For these reasons, in addition to existing 
literature on anti-Americanism in Latin 
America this study analyzes the most 
recent opinion polls available pertinent to 
Latin Americans’ opinions regarding the 
United States.
Literature Review
The definition of Anti-Americanism is 
widely debated but varies to include 
several factors such as opposition 
to American policies, culture, and 
economics. Each scholar writing on the 
topic includes their own definition and 
typology of anti-Americanism. Many of 
the works reviewed discuss the purpose 
of anti-Americanism in Latin America. 
The purpose of this paper, however, is 
not to argue the political effectiveness of 
Latin American anti-Americanism. 
Although Latin America is not the 
focus of much of the existing research on 
anti-Americanism, the research pertain-
ing specifically to how Latin America 
frames anti-Americanism in the region in 
three ways. Anti-Americanism in Latin 
America is characterized as irrational, 
as the understandable result of United 
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States imperialism and the neoliberal 
policies it advocates, or as a mixture of 
the two. 
In his book Yankee No! Anti-Ameri-
canism in U.S.-Latin American Relations, 
Alan McPherson examines the historical 
roots of anti-Americanism in Panama, 
Cuba, and the Dominican Republic as 
case studies for the rest of Latin America 
(2003). McPherson concludes that anti-
Americanism in those countries is a mix 
of opposition to US intervention in the 
region, a strong sense of national sover-
eignty, and the use of anti-Americanism 
as a political strategy. Although McPher-
son cites the use of anti-Americanism as 
a political strategy during Castro’s revo-
lution, it remains a useful strategy today. 
As Julia Sweig stated in an interview 
on Bush’s Latin America tour, “there’s 
nothing like George W. Bush as a target 
for whipping up nationalism and exploit-
ing divisions in the hemisphere” (2007). 
McPherson adds to that sentiment in his 
article "Myths of Anti-Americanism: 
The Case of Latin America," stating that 
“something must be present in order to 
be ‘whipped up,’” or anti-Americanism 
can be exploited by those in power, but 
cannot be created by those in power 
(2004, 148). 
When describing the specific in-
stances of U.S.-Latin American conflict 
of the 1960s in his country case studies, 
McPherson accuses the U.S. of mak-
ing mistakes in its dealings with Latin 
Americans, but at the same time accuses 
Latin American anti-Americanism of 
being ambivalent. McPherson points 
out that in a place like Cuba, American 
culture had become such an integral part 
of Cuban culture it was almost hypocriti-
cal to become so opposed to the United 
States. In his article, McPherson dispels 
the “myths” that anti-American is irra-
tional, and also the myth that all anti-
Americanism is rational. He faults the 
U.S. for discounting anti-Americanism 
as an emotion, and the racism associated 
with the “perceived natural emotionality 
of ‘Latins.’” Rather, McPherson argues 
that the emotional responses of Latin 
Americans are legitimate, given the 
trespasses of the United States against 
Latin America throughout history (2004, 
144). McPherson notes that not all 
anti-American responses to the U.S. are 
legitimate. He cites instances of Latin 
Americans rejecting reforms would have 
been favored, had they not been promot-
ed by “Yankees.” Targeting anger toward 
American citizens that have nothing to 
do with the formation of U.S. foreign 
policy is another instance of irrational 
anti-Americanism.  This type of irratio-
nal attack occurred in 1965 in Panama, 
when Panamanians rebelling against U.S. 
ownership of the Panama Canal attacked 
anyone they presumed to be American 
(McPherson 2004). 
 Alvaro Vargas Llossa goes farther 
than McPherson in characterizing Latin 
American anti-Americanism as irratio-
nal. Llossa places the blame for Latin 
America’s struggles entirely on the re-
cent emergence of leftist leaders (2007). 
He rejects the view that the United States 
commited historical wrongs against 
Latin American countries. He attributes 
sluggish economies to be a result of 
economic mismanagement perpetuated 
by leaders such as Fidel Castro, Hugo 
Chavez, and Evo Morales.
Various authors cite rejection of the 
neoliberal economic policies of the 
Washington Consensus as the reason 
for Latin America’s new anti-American 
Consensus. The failure of U.S.-propagat-
ed neoliberal reforms to incite growth, 
advance development, and eradicate ex-
treme poverty has caused disappointment 
and resentment throughout the region, 
especially in Latin America’s poor ma-
jority. As William Finnegan notes in his 
article "The Economics of Empire: Notes 
on the Washington Consensus," Argen-
tina is one of the most tragic examples 
of the failure of neoliberal reforms. Its 
U.S.-mandated reforms of privatization, 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and tax 
reform either caused or failed to prevent 
its economic collapse in 2001, a letdown 
Argentineans have not forgotten (2003). 
It can be argued that this may be one 
factor in Argentina’s current 32 percent 
approval of the U.S., shown in Table 4. 
Finnegan delineates the ways in which 
U.S. financial dominance over Latin 
America produces negative perceptions 
of the U.S. American dominance over in-
ternational institutions serves as a source 
of negative opinion. Institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund super-
cede national sovereignty and impose 
reforms that have massive impact on 
the lives of Latin Americans. Finnegan 
argues that massive foreign debt and the 
repatriation of profits of multinational 
companies to other countries contributes 
to anti-Americanism in Latin America 
(2003). 
According to Greg Grandin in his ar-
ticle "Latin America’s New Consensus," 
the U.S should not ignore the economic 
intentions of Latin America’s leftist 
leaders.  He estimates that roughly 300 
million of Latin America’s 520 million 
citizens live under governments that 
want to drastically reform or eradicate 
the Washington Consensus entirely 
(2006). That estimate is now larger, as 
more leftist leaders have been elected 
in Latin American countries since then. 
Leaders of Latin American countries are 
taking action to counter U.S. domina-
tion over regional economics. Mercosur, 
a trade agreement between a few South 
American nations, has been molded into 
a real alternative to the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas that the U.S. promotes. 
Those opposed to the Washington Con-
sensus have observed and want to avoid 
the “market polygamy” that Mexico 
experienced after NAFTA, where “the 
U.S. can have multiple trading partners 
but each of those partners must remain 
faithful to it [the U.S.] alone” (Grandin 
2006, 24).
Julia Sweig agrees with scholars 
who feel that anti-Americanism is the 
understandable result of bad U.S. foreign 
policy. In her book Friendly Fire: Los-
ing Friends and Making Enemies in the 
Anti-American Century, Sweig blames a 
variety of factors for anti-Americanism. 
A large portion of anti-Americanism is 
caused by “the very fact of U.S. power,” 
the same cause Diven allocates to Tier I 
of her three tiered model (Sweig 2006, 
35). Diven and Sweig agree that the U.S. 
role of the hegemon is enough to incite 
resentment in countries. Sweig also 
chastises the United States for getting its 
information about how Latin Americans 
feel from the top twenty percent of the 
country’s elites, rather than the eighty 
percent of the country’s poor population. 
Similar to scholars such as George Gran-
din and William Finnegan, Sweig cites 
the failure of the Washington Consensus 
to produce wealth in Latin America as a 
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cause of anti-Americanism. Sweig states 
that if the 1980s were known as the “lost 
decade” in Latin America due to the eco-
nomic chaos caused by hyperinflation, 
the 1990s was the decade of “lost hope” 
when the wealth that neoliberalism was 
supposed to bring never materialized. In 
Sweig’s opinion, this helped set the stage 
for the anti-Americanism the U.S. now 
faces in Latin America (Sweig 2006). 
While there are many theoretical 
frameworks for analysis for anti-Ameri-
canism, Diven’s model highlights the 
multidimensional and integrated nature 
of the causes of anti-Americanism, and 
separates the categories of anti-Ameri-
canism into logical divisions. This model 
is flexible, in that it can be applied to 
single countries or stretched to include 
entire regions. Katzenstein and Keohane 
distinguish between types of anti-Ameri-
canism in their book Anti-Americanisms 
in World Politics (2007), but the division 
between liberal and social anti-Ameri-
canism is unnecessary. Focusing on one 
topic as the cause of anti-Americanism 
as Finnegan does is valid, but does not 
explain all types or the depth of anti-
Americanism in the region. Rather than 
simply describe types of anti-American-
ism, Diven’s model demonstrates how 
the different types build on one another 
to create anti-Americanism with vary-
ing depths. Because of its usefulness in 
determining potential causes as well as 
the depths of anti-Americanism, it will 
be used to analyze anti-Americanism in 
the following case studies.
Venezuela
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
makes no secret of how he feels about 
President Bush. Chavez has made his 
opinion clear on a number of occasions, 
notably calling Bush the “devil” in front 
of the United Nations General Assembly 
in September of 2006. Examination of 
the most recent opinion polls reveals 
that Venezuelans do not have a very high 
approval of the United States. Only 41 
percent of Venezuelans view the United 
States positively (Table 4), and 85 
percent feel that the United States does 
not solve the world’s problems (Table 
1).  Venezuelan anti-Americanism goes 
deeper than the inflammatory language 
of its leader. 
Tier I Analysis- History and System Structure
Latin America’s significance to the 
United States changed with the end of 
the Cold War and the emergence of a 
unipolar global power structure. During 
the Cold War, the United States battled 
to keep the Soviet Union from taking 
the influence over Latin Americans the 
U.S. had enjoyed since the Monroe 
Doctrine. In Cuba, the United States 
lost that battle. Numerous interventions 
in other countries ensured that other 
governments hostile to the United States 
were not allowed to stay in power. In 
today’s unipolar international system 
structure, the U.S. is no longer concerned 
about Soviet influence in the hemisphere 
and therefore not as concerned with the 
affairs of Latin American countries. 
While most Latin American countries 
accept the U.S. as the global hegemon 
and work within that context, Venezuela 
is part of a growing movement of Latin 
American leaders who do not. Cuba 
has tried to undermine U.S. influence 
in Latin America since the Cold War, 
but does not have anywhere near the 
resources Venezuela has. The interna-
tional system structure has proven to be 
a powerful source of anti-Americanism 
for Venezuela. It has spurred Hugo 
Chavez to strive to not only undermine 
U.S. power and influence, but to also to 
try to establish Venezuela as the regional 
power. Chavez’s success in establishing 
Venezuela as a regional leader has been 
limited. While he has allies in leaders 
like Fidel and Raul Castro and Evo Mo-
rales, polls indicate that Latin Americans 
actually have the highest opinion of Bra-
zil’s President Lula Da Silva. In addition, 
Brazil is the country Latin Americans 
trust most (Table 6). Regardless, Chavez 
has been using oil revenues to support 
the aid packages he extends to countries 
in an effort to stem U.S. global influence. 
Chavez has even subsidized oil in poor 
neighborhoods in New York, perhaps an 
effort to make the U.S. government ap-
pear negligent (Carillo 2005).
Venezuela, like many other Latin 
American countries, has been ruled 
by dictators for some time in the na-
tion’s history. Those dictators supported 
U.S. interests in the region, and in turn 
received support from the United States. 
The U.S. backed Juan Vicente Gomez 
from 1908 to 1935, and Marcos Perez 
Jimenez from 1950 through 1958. The 
United States’ support of Perez is what 
prompted the 1958 protests at Vice 
President Nixon’s visit to Caracas (Ewell 
1996). There is a strong legacy of inter-
vention attached to the United States in 
Latin America, one that factors greatly 
into the first tier of anti-Americanism, 
and within the context of the tier model, 
gives Latin America reason to have 
deeply rooted, or what Joseph Nye would 
call “legacy” anti-Americanism.
Tier II Analysis- Cultural and Economic Ties
Latin America has an interesting 
cultural relationship with the United 
States. Scholars such as McPherson 
and Patterson who have researched 
anti-Americanism in Latin America 
often highlight the ambivalent nature 
of Latin Americans regarding culture. 
Because the United States has had so 
much interaction with and influence in 
the region, American culture has been 
prevalent in Latin America as long as the 
U.S. has been a superpower. 
Cuba and Venezuela are perfect exam-
ples of countries displaying ambivalence 
toward the U.S. As a result of the Platt 
Amendment in Cuba, Cuban culture was 
so heavily influenced by American cul-
ture that Cubans began rejecting America 
in an effort to define their own culture at 
the time Fidel Castro was struggling to 
take power. As Alan McPherson ex-
plained, “An anti-Americanism that went 
to the root of Cuba’s intimacy with the 
United States urged Cubans to admit how 
dependent they were on it for their very 
sense of themselves as a nation; revers-
ing that dependence meant redefining 
‘Cubanness’ itself” (2003, 49). Fidel 
Castro encouraged this rejection of the 
United States and used anti-Americanism 
as a source of nationalism and a point 
of political unification throughout his 
revolution. Venezuela and Cuba have 
faced similar situations. According to 
Judith Ewell, "Geography, history, and 
petroleum have thus facilitated a greater 
degree of 'Americanization' in Venezuela 
than any other Latin American nation" 
(1996, 5).  In both Cuba and Venezuela, 
American baseball has gained more 
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popularity than futbol (soccer), which is 
the most popular sport in the rest of Latin 
America. On the other hand, both Cuba 
and Venezuela now have leaders that are 
notorious for their use of vehement anti-
Americanism as a political platform. Just 
as Castro campaigned against American 
culture in Cuba, Hugo Chavez is enact-
ing laws to preserve Venezuelan culture. 
Chavez recently passed a law that fifty 
percent of music played on the radio 
must be by Venezuelan musicians. Of the 
Venezuelan music, half of it must be tra-
ditional Andean folk music (Washington 
Post 2007).  Despite the leaders of Cuba 
and Venezuela’s distaste for American 
culture, much of the Latin American 
public likes it (Table 8). Latin Americans 
are, however, are opposed to the spread 
of American ideas and customs (Table 9). 
This opposition to the spread of Ameri-
can culture along with the emphasis on 
strengthening nationalism indicates a cul-
tural conflict between the United States 
and many Latin Americans.
Aside from culture, a conflict that is 
unique to Venezuela is a conflict over 
resources, specifically petroleum. Since 
the economic boom of World War II in 
the U.S., and Venezuela became a vital 
oil supplier to the U.S., Venezuelan 
economy and politics has been influ-
enced by this important investor (Ewell 
1996). Throughout Venezuela’s history, 
oil shortages gave Venezuelans bargain-
ing power against the U.S., and in times 
of oil abundance, Venezuela was at a 
disadvantage. Oil interests played into 
which Venezuelan dictators the United 
States supported, and which leaders it 
chose to oppose (Ewell 1996). Currently, 
Venezuela is the world’s fourth largest 
petroleum exporter, and an important 
supplier to the United States’ staggering 
demand for oil (BBC 2002).  The fact 
that Hugo Chavez has oil to bargain with 
makes his political rhetoric hard for the 
United States to ignore, and more reason 
for his anti-U.S. stance to be worrisome.
Tier III Analysis- Current Leadership 
and Policies
Venezuela is in no short supply of the 
components of anti-Americanism that 
make up Tier III. Venezuelans in general 
appear to be in contention with the 
current leaders and policies of the United 
States. As was previously mentioned, 
Hugo Chavez is extremely opposed to 
the Bush administration and the policies 
attached to that administration. Chavez, 
like other Latin American countries, 
and much of the world for that matter, 
is opposed to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
Table 3 shows opposition to the Iraq war 
in four Latin American countries.
In 1992 Chavez was overthrown for 
a brief period in his first term of presi-
dency by a coup. The U.S. was quick to 
recognize the new government and the 
image of the U.S. suffered when his pres-
idency was restored by popular demand. 
Since then, Chavez has been convinced 
that the CIA supported that coup and 
that the Bush administration has planned 
assassination attempts on Chavez’s life. 
The Bush administration denies this, but 
Chavez’s suspicion adds to his antago-
nism towards Bush and his policies. 
Political relations between the U.S. 
and Venezuelan governments are tense. 
Chavez has actively challenged U.S. 
hegemony by trying to undermine U.S. 
influence in any way possible. In addi-
tion to distributing subsidized oil to poor 
families New York, he has made political 
alliances with states hostile to the U.S. 
such as Iran and Cuba. While the opin-
ions of a leader are not always the same 
as their constituents’, Chavez not only 
has the support of the poor majority in 
his country, but also has many state-run 
media outlets to publicize his rhetoric, 
including a daily talk show. While Ven-
ezuelans may not necessarily agree with 
Chavez’s opinions on the United States, 
polls indicate a low approval of the U.S., 
and Chavez may have some influence 
on those opinions. Regardless, political 
relations between the two countries are 
important to examine, as they factor into 
the third tier of anti-Americanism. 
Mexico
Mexico was President Bush’s last stop 
on his recent tour of Latin America, 
and like all of the other countries on the 
tour, Bush was met with protesters. The 
protests in Mexico largely focused on 
the Iraq war, and as Table 3 indicates, 
approximately 80 percent of Mexicans 
disapprove of the U.S. handling of the 
war in Iraq. Iraq, however, is only one 
of the many points of contention Mexico 
has with its northern neighbor. 
Tier I Analysis- History and System Structure
 
Historically, Mexico has been 
considered an ally of the United States. 
The two countries share a border, which 
automatically increases interaction 
and makes cooperation on security 
imperative.  Various scholars have 
established that the unipolar international 
system structure is a source of global 
anti-Americanism. The wealth of 
economic, military, and political power 
the United States has amassed for itself 
inspires global criticism and envy.  It 
makes perfect sense then for Mexico to 
harbor resentment or jealousy toward the 
United States due to the stark contrast 
in wealth between the two neighbors. 
As Mexican author Octavio Paz said, 
Mexico is “so far from God and so near 
to the United States” (McPherson 2004, 
141). The United States is the wealthiest 
nation in the world, while around half of 
Mexico’s citizens live in poverty (Rubio 
and Davidow 2006). 
     Although most Americans accept 
the continental United States as a given, 
Mexicans remember that the southwest-
ern portion of the United States belonged 
to Mexico until 1867. States such as 
California, Arizona, and Texas used to 
be part of Mexico, and are now the states 
with the most concentrated populations 
of Mexican immigrants. In light of the 
fierce debate over the U.S. immigration 
regulations, Mexicans claim that “we did 
not jump the border, the border jumped 
us.” 
     Because the United States is consid
ered the global hegemon, it is often 
considered “accountable for a dispropor-
tionate share of the world’s ills” (Diven 
2007, 9),  and in turn is expected to solve 
the world’s problems. Mexico was not a 
functioning democracy for the seventy 
years that the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) dominated Mexican 
elections. During a substantial portion 
of this period the United States was the 
global hegemon and also claimed to pro-
mote democracy worldwide. For years, 
however, it did nothing to fix democracy 
in Mexico. When the United States is ex-
pected to solve problems perceived to be 
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in its capacity and does not do so, anti-
Americanism grows. As Table 1 denotes, 
74 percent of Mexicans feel that the U.S. 
does not solve the world’s problems. 
This is clearly a negative perception of 
the United States, as this figure includes 
those who said the U.S. does “too much,” 
those who said it does “too little,” and 
those volunteering that the U.S. does 
“nothing” (Pew 2002). 
In Latin America’s case, the wrongdo-
ing of the United States is usually that 
it has done too much. Starting with the 
Monroe Doctrine and followed by the 
Roosevelt corollary, military interven-
tions, and pushing neoliberal economic 
reforms today, the United States has 
often taken the liberty of intervening in 
order to support U.S. interests in Latin 
America. This legacy of intervention in 
Latin America makes Latin Americans 
view U.S. actions as imperialism and an 
invasion of their sovereignty, a legacy 
that most do not welcome. Like almost 
every other Latin American country, 
Mexico has incidents of intervention by 
the United States embedded in its history. 
In 1914 President Wilson’s troops took 
control of the city of Veracruz in order to 
overthrow the dictator Victoriano Huerta 
and install Venustiano Carranza in his 
place. Mexico and Venezuela are just 
two examples, but the United States has 
meddled in the affairs of almost every 
Latin American country at one time or 
another. This legacy of intervention has 
built a solid foundation for Tier I anti-
Americanism in Latin America. 
Tier II Analysis- Cultural and Economic Ties
Adding further cause for resentment 
is the fact that Mexico and the United 
States share membership along with 
Canada in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement. NAFTA was crafted 
in order to foment economic growth in 
all three nations, but over a decade into 
the agreement, Mexico has not benefited 
as much as it had desired. Mexico 
had high hopes for the agreement, 
and ex-President Carlos Salinas even 
amended Mexico’s Constitution in 
order to participate in the agreement. 
Currently, Mexico’s GDP growth rate 
is a modest 4.5%, and a GDP per capita 
of $10,600 (CIA World Factbook 
2007). NAFTA has exacerbated internal 
cleavages in Mexico as the southern, 
mostly indigenous populations feel 
that Mexicans in the northern states 
have gained disproportionately from 
NAFTA (Rubio and Davidow 2006). In 
fact, southern Mexicans from Chiapas 
were opposed to NAFTA from the very 
beginning. On January 1, 1994, the 
Zapatistas coordinated their peasant 
uprising to coincide with NAFTA taking 
effect. Mexican small farmers had reason 
to fear the effects of NAFTA. NAFTA 
opened Mexico’s markets to U.S. corn 
imports, and Mexico’s small farmers 
were unable to compete with the heavily 
subsidized American corn. It is possible 
that NAFTA could be part of the reason 
why 55 percent of Mexicans feel that the 
U.S. increases the gap between rich and 
poor (Table 1). 
The most debated and most conten-
tious conflict in U.S.-Mexican relations 
at the moment is the issue of immigra-
tion. As it stands, 500,000 Mexicans 
migrate to the United States annually 
(Reid 2006). An estimated eleven million 
undocumented immigrants currently re-
side in the United States, and a substan-
tial portion of those people are Mexican 
(Rubio and Davidow 2006). Immigra-
tion is important to Mexicans because 
the United States can provide economic 
opportunities that Mexico cannot. Not 
only can workers earn better wages in the 
United States, but the remittances that 
are repatriated help family members who 
are left in Mexico to survive. Immigra-
tion is an important issue not only on the 
individual level, but on the governmental 
level also. The remittances sent from 
Mexicans in the U.S. comprise Mexico’s 
second largest source of income. The 
previous president of Mexico, Vicente 
Fox, made immigration reform a prior-
ity of his administration and President 
Bush seemed receptive to negotiations. 
Any progress toward reform was lost, 
however, after the September 11th at-
tacks occurred and securing U.S. borders 
became a priority. 
The authorization by Congress to build 
a wall along the Mexican border has in-
flamed hostility from Mexicans. Simply 
constructing a wall will not stop the flow 
of unauthorized immigration. It does, 
however, send a message to Mexicans 
that they are unwelcome in the United 
States. Another message came from the 
passage of HR4437 by the House of 
Representatives, a bill that would make 
unauthorized immigration a felony and 
allow for prosecution of anyone provid-
ing services to undocumented immi-
grants.  This bill failed in the Senate, but 
sparked protests across the nation.
Current Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon has not dropped the issue of 
immigration from his political agenda. 
Mexico was President Bush’s last stop on 
his recent goodwill tour of Latin America 
and Felipe Calderon bypassed easy 
diplomacy of skirting issues and pressed 
Bush for answers regarding immigration 
reform (Jackson 2007). 
The U.S. government heavily em-
phasizes the issue of drug trafficking 
throughout all of Latin America. Because 
Mexico’s shared border serves as an 
entry point for drugs, the issue is particu-
larly stressed in dealing with Mexico. 
Because drug trafficking is so frequently 
the focus of dealings with Latin Ameri-
can countries, the citizens of these coun-
tries begin to harbor resentment toward 
the United States. As President Calderon 
points out, it is difficult for Mexico to 
slow down drug trafficking without 
a decrease in demand from the U.S. 
(Jackson 2007). There are many pressing 
issues that Latin Americans would like 
to see discussed with the United States, 
yet the discussions so often turn to drug 
trafficking. In a region that already feels 
neglected in comparison to other regions 
like the Middle East, ignoring the inter-
ests of Latin Americans does not foster 
good feelings. Latin Americans may feel 
coerced into complying with U.S. wishes 
regarding drugs, as the U.S. supplies aid 
to those countries who comply and disin-
centives to those who do not. Colombia 
has received over $4 billion to combat 
drugs while Bolivia receives scorn from 
Washington for supporting coca produc-
tion (Sweig 2007). 
Tier III Analysis- Current Leadership 
and Policies
The most short-term causes of anti-
Americanism in Mexico center around 
the current U.S. administration and its 
foreign policies. On President Bush’s 
The Latin American Consensus
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recent tour of Latin America he was 
met with protests at every stop. Most 
of the signs toted by angry Latin 
Americans were anti-Bush or anti-
Iraq War. If Latin Americans’ only 
source of anti-Americanism were what 
the signs claimed, eradicating anti-
Americanism would be somewhat 
simple. Although the Iraq War has 
proven to be a greater undertaking 
than was originally forecasted, it 
will eventually end. President Bush’s 
Presidency will definitely end in 2008. 
Tier III clearly plays a role in generating 
anti-Americanism, but it is unclear 
how much. Anti-Americanism in Latin 
America may decline as a result of the 
current leadership and policies, but it will 
not disappear based on the longer-term 
causes in Tier II and I. 
Polls
The following collection of polls serves 
as a mechanism to gauge current levels 
of anti-Americanism in the region. 
Collectively, these polls demonstrate 
Latin American’s multifaceted view of 
the United States. These polls can be 
cross-examined in several ways. A few 
polls indicate Latin America’s overall 
approval of the U.S., including Table 
2, Table 4, and Table 5. An interesting 
variable to compare in these tables is 
how rankings differ by country, and also 
how levels change depending on how 
the question is asked. In this example, 
it is unclear which of the three tiers any 
disapproval can be attributed to. On 
the other hand, polls such as Tables 8 
and 9 fit into Tier II anti-Americanism, 
and Table 3 and Table 6 can be clearly 
classified as Tier III anti-Americanism.
The polls used are all conducted by 
the nonpartisan organizations of the Pew 
Research Center, Corporacion Latino-
barometro, and the Program on Interna-
tional Policy Attitudes. All of the polls 
used are no less recent than the year 2002. 
Polls from the Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey were all performed face-to-
face, and while the polls in some of the 
countries claim to represent one hun-
dred percent of the adult population, a 
problem in a few of the countries was 
that the sample was disproportionately 
urban, which could potentially influence 
people’s opinions.  
The Program on International Policy 
Attitudes conducted all four of the 
surveys in Latin American countries 
face-to-face. The surveys in Argentina 
and Mexico are supposedly representa-
tive of the entire nation, but the surveys 
in Brazil and Chile are representative of 
the urban population.
Surveys executed by Latinobarometro 
all claim to represent one hundred per-
cent of the adult population living in the 
countries surveyed, with the exception 
of Chile and Paraguay. The percentage 
represented in those countries was 70 
percent and 97 percent, respectively.
 
Table 1. Latin Americans’ Opinions about 
the U.S. Solving the World’s Problems 
and Increasing the Poverty Gap
Venezuela 85 48
Bolivia 76 74
Mexico 74 55
Guatemala 69 55
Honduras 67 45
Argentina 65 67
Brazil  65 60
Peru  60 55
* Includes those who said the U.S. 
does “too much,” those who said it does 
“too little,” and those volunteering that 
the U.S. does “nothing.” The percent-
ages above reflect that Latin American 
countries feel the United States does 
not act appropriately to help solve the 
world’s problems, whether that means it 
does too much, not enough, or nothing at 
all. The other poll above shows that Latin 
American countries feel that the United 
States actually increases the gap between 
the world’s rich and poor. Because Latin 
America is a region containing devel-
oping countries, poverty is a pressing 
problem to many Latin Americans. These 
polls reflect dissatisfaction with the U.S. 
role in solving global problems. 
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002
Table 2. Latin Americans’ Opinions 
About U.S. Influence in the World as 
Mainly Positive or Mainly Negative
Argentina 13 64 23
Brazil  29 57 13
Chile   33 51 17
Mexico 12 53 35
Source: Program on International Policy 
Attitudes, 2006
Table 3.  Latin Americans’ Opinions 
About the U.S. Handling of the War 
in Iraq
Argentina 3 92 6
Brazil  12 85 3
Chile  23 65 12
Mexico 13 80 7
Source: Program on International Policy 
Attitudes, 2006
A poll on opinion about the Iraq War 
is useful because it demonstrates how 
stratifying an issue from the Third 
Tier can be. Table 3 demonstrates an 
overwhelming disapproval of the U.S. 
involvement in Iraq. 
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Table 4. Latin American Opinion 
About the United States
Honduras 87
Panama 83
El Salvador 81
Guatemala 77
Costa Rica 75
Dom. Rep. 74
Peru  71
Colombia 70
Nicaragua 68
Ecuador 66
Chile  57
Brazil  53
Mexico 53
Bolivia 50
Paraguay 48
Venezuela 41
Uruguay 38
Argentina 32
L. America 61
* “Good” plus “very good” opinions 
of the United States 
Source: Latinobarometro 2000-2005
Case studies Mexico and Venezuela 
have low approval of the United States, 
with 53 percent approval and 41 percent 
approval, respectively.
Table 5. Latin America’s Confidence in 
the United States
A little or no confidence  61%
A lot or some confidence 34%
Did not know/ Did not ask 5%
Source: Latinobarometro 2005
While there is a 61 percent average 
approval rating of the U.S. for Latin 
America, when asked a different question 
the results are much more negative. 
The same amount responded that they 
had little or no confidence in the United 
States, and only 31 percent responded 
that they had a lot of confidence or some 
confidence in the U.S.
Table 6. Image of Leaders*
 
Lula Da Silva 5.6 5.8 5.8
Hugo Chavez 4.5 5.2 5.0
Fidel Castro 3.4 4.8 4.4
G. W. Bush 5.6 4.1 4.8
*Q. I will list you a number of foreign 
leaders. I want you to evaluate them on a 
0 to 10 scale, where 0 means a very bad 
evaluation and 10 very good. Or do you 
not know enough to have an opinion? 
Source: Latinobarometro 2005
The above poll shows that despite the 
tensions between the two, Latin Ameri-
cans rate Hugo Chavez and George W. 
Bush very similarly with a rating of a 5.0 
and a 4.8 respectively. 
Table 7. Most Trusted Latin 
American Countries
Brazil  11
Argentina 6
Chile  6
Costa Rica 5
Mexico 4
Venezuela 4
Colombia 3
Panama 2
Uruguay 2
Cuba  2
Ecuador 1
El Salvador 1
Guatemala 1
Honduras 1
Nicaragua 1
Peru  1
Source: Latinobarometro 2005
The above poll shows the frequency 
with which Latin Americans ranked the 
listed countries the country they trust 
most. Lula Da Silva is the leader Latin 
Americans trust most (Table 6) and 
Brazil the country Latin Americans trusts 
most. Mexico and Venezuela both earned 
the same ranking for trustworthiness. 
Incidentally, the countries with the 
highest approval rating of the United 
States, such as Honduras, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala (Table 4), are also among 
the least trusted by other Latin American 
countries (Table 7). The inverse is also 
true: Brazil and Argentina have low 
approval ratings of the United States and 
are also the two most-trusted countries. 
Table 8. Latin Americans’ Opinions on 
American Popular Culture
Venezuela 78 20 2
Honduras 71 25 4
Guatemala 70 26 5
Brazil  69 29 2
Mexico 60 30 10
Peru  46 43 11
Bolivia 39 54 7
Argentina 52 38 10
Source: 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey
Table 9. Latin Americans’ Opinion 
on the Spread of American Ideas 
and Customs
Venezuela 44 52 4
Honduras 44 53 4
Guatemala 40 53 7
Peru  37 50 13
Brazil  30 62 8
Mexico 22 65 13
Bolivia 22 73 5
Argentina 16 73 11
Source: 2002 Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey
The Latin American Consensus
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Latin Americans like American popular 
culture (Table 8), but disapprove of the 
spread of American ideas and customs 
(Table 9). Although Venezuela has a 
lower general approval of the U.S. than 
Mexico (Table 4), Venezuelans actually 
like American popular culture and 
approve of its spread much more than 
Mexicans. The approval of American 
culture but disapproval of the U.S. 
overall highlights the ambivalence that is 
an integral aspect to Latin American anti-
Americanism. 
 
Conclusions
The combination of polls and case 
studies have illuminated findings on 
anti-Americanism in Latin America in 
general, and inVenezuela and Mexico in 
particular. Although every country has 
its own unique history and relations with 
the United States, Mexico and Venezuela 
are case studies that are applicable 
to the rest of Latin America because 
they have events in their histories and 
elements in their relations that are shared 
with other Latin American countries. 
Diven’s three-tiered model is a useful 
tool for analyzing anti-Americanism in 
Latin American countries. It has been 
able to explain why countries that have 
close relations with the U.S. can have 
reason to harbor resentment toward the 
United States. The model is also useful 
because it predicts how much of the anti-
Americanism seen in polls is short-term 
and has the potential to dissipate with a 
new administration in power in the U.S. 
and how much is long-term and harder to 
change. 
This research has tested a model that 
has never before been tested and found 
it to be very effective in determining the 
causes and significance of anti-Amer-
icanism in a country. Determining the 
causes of anti-Americanism is valuable 
in any region, and Latin America is 
not the exception it is treated as. Latin 
America is a region that was strategi-
cally important to the U.S. during the 
Cold War. The U.S. is no longer battling 
the Soviet Union for influence over the 
Western hemisphere but that does not 
mean that the U.S. is not in a battle over 
influence. Opinion polls indicate that 
anti-Americanism in Latin America is 
prevalent. While there is debate over the 
consequences of anti-Americanism, an 
outcome of anti-Americanism is never 
that it advances U.S. interests and influ-
ence in an area where it is present. 
It is not proven that the recent elec-
tions of leftist leaders in Latin America is 
a result of, or even correlated to, anti-
Americanism in the region. It should 
not be discounted entirely, however, that 
this is not in any way a consequence 
of anti-Americanism, or will foster 
anti-Americanism as a consequence. 
Opposition to the neoliberal economic 
model promoted by the U.S. known as 
the Washington Consensus has fostered 
plenty of anti-Americanism on its own. 
The U.S. has made clear its position on 
the aforementioned leaders of Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Ecuador dur-
ing their campaigns, and yet they were 
still elected into office. If the citizens 
of these countries were more concerned 
with staying in the good graces of the 
United States they would not have 
elected these leaders. Yet they did, which 
sends the message that anti-Americanism 
is undermining U.S. influence over the 
region.
A study of the causes of anti-Ameri-
canism in Venezuela reveals that a great 
deal of it can be attributed to Tier I and 
Tier III causes. The United States has a 
legacy of intervention in Latin America, 
and Venezuela is no exception. The U.S. 
has a history of supporting unpopular 
dicators in Venezuela and of oppos-
ing popular leaders. Infringement on 
sovereignty is cause for resentment in 
Venezuela and every other Latin Ameri-
can nation that has experienced it. A 
puzzling observation, however, is that 
the U.S. has much higher approval rat-
ings in Central America, a region where 
the United States was very involved in 
horrific civil wars. This may mean that 
Tier I anti-Americanism plays a greater 
role in Venezuela than it does in Central 
American countries. It also appears that 
anti-Americanism in Venezuela comes 
from the Tier III causes or current U.S. 
leaders and policies. 
Anti-Americanism in Mexico ap-
pears to come from more of a mixture of 
tiers than Venezuela. While Mexico has 
reason to harbor Tier I anti-Americanism 
and seems to be opposed to current U.S. 
leaders and policies, Tier II anti-Ameri-
canism has a greater role in Mexico than 
in Venezuela. This can be seen in Tables 
8 and 9 where Mexicans generally like 
American popular culture but really dis-
like its spread. These conflicting opinions 
are an example of what scholars describe 
when they refer to Latin American am-
bivalence towards the United States.  The 
United States and Mexico are still allies, 
but the current debate over immigration 
reform contributes greatly to Tier III anti-
Americanism.
A mixture of history, politics, econom-
ics, and culture makes Latin America’s 
view toward the U.S. a complex one. 
While countries as different as Mexico 
and Venezuela may disagree on a variety 
of issues, they are in agreement on the 
issue of the United States. Mexico and 
Venezuela are not, however, the only 
examples of countries in Latin America 
with very different ideologies and histo-
ries that are in consensus in their opposi-
tion toward the United States. A study 
of data and literature reveals that many 
countries, regardless of their differences, 
display anti-Americanism. 
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